We introduce a notion of Kripke model for classical logic for which we constructively prove soundness and cut-free completeness. We discuss the novelty of the notion and its potential applications.
Introduction
Kripke models have been introduced as means of giving semantics to modal logics and were later used to give semantics for intuitionistic logic as well, cf. [22, 23] . The purpose of the present paper is to show that Kripke models can also be used as semantics for classical logic. Of course, Kripke semantics can be indirectly assigned to classical logic by means of some appropriate double-negation translation, as in [3] , but our goal here is to provide a direct presentation of a notion of Kripke semantics for classical logic.
We will use the LK µμ sequent calculus of [8] to represent proofs, but the conclusions given apply to any complete formal system for classical logic. There are at least two reasons for choosing LK µμ : first, it is a typing system for a calculus very close to λ-calculus and we are ultimately interested in the computational content of classical logic; second, the symmetry of left/right distinguished formulae of LK µμ allows to give two dual notions of models, of which only one needs to be, and is, presented in this paper, while the other can be derived by analogy. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of classical Kripke model, based on two modifications to the traditional notion, and discusses the relationship between the traditional and our notion. Section 3 introduces the sequent calculus LK µμ and gives a soundness theorem for it. Section 4 proves a completeness theorem for a universal model constructed from the deduction system itself. Section 5 is the concluding section which discusses related and future work.
We use the standard inductive definition of predicate logic formulae for the connectives {⊤, ⊥, ∧, ∨, →, ∃, ∀}. The language has infinitely many constants. A sentence is a formula where all variables are bound by quantifiers. An atomic formula is one which is not built up from logical connectives, i.e. it is one built up of a predicate symbol. The shorthand ¬A stands for A → ⊥.
All statements and proofs are constructive.
Classical Kripke Models
Kripke models can be considered as the "most classical" of all the semantics for intuitionistic logic, for two reasons: first, each of the 'possible worlds' that define a Kripke model is a classical world in itself (where either an atom or its negation are true); second, it is the single of the semantics for intuitionistic logic which has only a classical proof of completeness, when disjunction and existential quantification are considered. 1 In the last two decades, the Curry-Howard correspondence between intuitionistic proof systems and typed lambda-calculi has been extended to classical proof systems [17, 29, 8] . The idea for introducing direct-style Kripke models for classical logic came from their usefulness in providing normalisation-by-evaluation for intuitionistic proof systems [6, 7] . To account for a classical proof system we modify the traditional notion of Kripke model in the following two ways.
Not taking the forcing relation as primitive. We take as primitive the notion of "strong refutation", and define forcing in terms of it. 2 The forcing definition we get in this way partly coincides with the traditional definition of forcing, as explained in subsection 2.1.
Allowing certain nodes to validate absurdity. We allow certain possible worlds to be marked as "fallible", or "exploding". This approach has been taken for Kripke models in [35] , for Beth models by Friedman [31] and is necessary in order to have a constructive proof of completeness, in the view of the meta-mathematical results from [21, 26, 27] , which preclude constructive proofs 3 of completeness in case one wants to retain that absurdity must never be valid in a possible world 4 .
Definition 1. A classical Kripke model is given by a quintuple
There is an intuitionistic proof in [35] , but it makes use of the fan theorem which is not universally recognised as constructive. 2 For an alternative, see the discussion on dual models in Section 5. 3 Strictly speaking, the cited results show that having a constructive proof of completeness implies having a proof of Markov's Principle. 4 Extending the class of Boolean models with inconsistent models is also the key to the constructive proof of the classical completeness theorem in [24] . For an analysis of that result, see [4] .
• (K, ≤) is a poset of "possible worlds";
• D is the "domain function" assigning sets to the elements of K such that
i.e., D is monotone;
Let the language be extended with constant symbols for each element of D := ∪{D(w) : w ∈ K}.
• (−) : (−) s is a binary relation of "strong refutation" between worlds and atomic sentences in the extended language such that
• (−) ⊥ is a unary relation on worlds labelling a world as "exploding", which is also monotone:
The strong refutation relation is extended from atomic to composite sentences inductively and by mutually defining the relations of forcing and (non-strong) refutation. • w : A → B s if w : A and w : B ;
• ⊥ is always strongly refuted;
• ⊤ is never strongly refuted.
The notions of forcing and refutation can be somewhat understood as the classical notions of being true and being false. However, a statement of form P ⇒ w ⊥ should not be thought of as negation of P at the meta-level, because in the concrete model we provide in section 4, w ⊥ is always an inhabited set. In other words, we never use ex falso quodlibet at the meta-level to handle exploding nodes.
The notion of strong refutation is more informative than the notion of (non-strong) refutation, not only because the former implies the latter, but also because, for example, having w : A ∧ B s tells us which one of A, B is refuted, while w : A ∧ B does not.
A more detailed characterisation of the notions is given in the rest of this section. 
Relation to Traditional Forcing and Further Properties
It is natural to ask what is the relationship between traditional intuitionistic forcing [31] and our forcing whose definition relies on a more primitive notion. Lemmas 5 and 8 give that the two notions (superficially) coincide on the fragment of formulae constructed by {→, ∧, ∀, ⊤} Lemma 5. The following statements hold.
Proof. Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are used implicitly in the following proof.
( 
The rest of the cases are obvious.
Note, however, that although the definitions of our and intuitionistic forcing "match" on the fragment {→, ∧, ∀, ⊤}, that does not mean that a formula in that fragment is forced in our sense if and only if it is forced in the intuitionistic sense. The law of Peirce ((A → B) → A) → A is one counterexample to that, it is classically but not intuitionistically forced; this is so because in our forcing, hidden under the surface, there is a notion of refutation which can be used.
Remark 6. The following do not hold in general, even if reasoning classically.
• w : A ∨ B =⇒ w : A or w : B.
The explanation is deferred to Remark 20.
Lemma 7.
Given a classical Kripke model K, the following hold.
Proof. We can also say that forcing of ⊥ and ⊤ behaves like expected with respect to exploding nodes [35, 24] 
We can use the previous lemmas to show that the forcing relation for classical logic behaves "classically" indeed:
Lemma 9. The following hold in the classical Kripke semantics.
We now consider the following double-negation translation (·) * , which is the one of Gödel-Gentzen [16, 15] , except that atomic formulae, ⊥ and ⊤ are not doubly negated: Proof. By induction on the complexity of A and by using (1)- (3) from Lemma 5 and (2) from Lemma 8. We detail only the induction case for ∨, which is the most involved one:
LK µμ and Soundness
To emphasise the symmetries of classical logic, we use a sequent calculus in the style of Gentzen's LK as proof system. We could have directly used LK or one of its variants with implicit structural rules,à la Kleene-Kanger. In practise, even though the current paper does not go into the details of the computational content of proofs, we rely here on LK µμ which has a simple symmetrical variant of λ-calculus as underlying language of proofs [8, 18] 5 . LK µμ is presented on Table 1 . It differs from LK in the following points:
• Sequents come with an explicitly distinguished formula on the right or on the left, or no distinguished formula at all, resulting in three kinds of sequents: "Γ ⊢ ∆", "Γ|A ⊢ ∆" and "Γ ⊢ A|∆". Especially, the distinguished formula plays an "active" rôle in the rules.
• Accordingly, the axiom rule splits into two variants (Ax L ) and (Ax R ) depending on whether the left active formula or the right active formula is distinguished.
There are also two new rules, (µ) and (μ), for making a formula active 6 .
• There are no explicit contraction rules: contractions are derivable from a cut against an axiom as follows:
-Left contraction:
• Consequently, the notion of normal proof, or cut-freeness, is slightly different from the notion of cut-freeness in LK: a normal proof is a proof whose only cuts are of the form of a cut between an axiom and an introduction rule 7 . This is the notion that we refer to when below, very often, we say "cut-free" or "provable without a cut".
The correspondence between normal proofs of LK and normal proofs of LK µμ is direct. If we present LK with weakening rules attached to the axiom rulesà la Kleene's G 4 or Kanger's LC, we obtain an LK proof from an LK µμ proof by erasing the bars serving to distinguish active formulae, and by removing the trivial inferences coming from the rules (µ) and (μ). In the other way round, every introduction rule of LK can be derived in LK µμ by applying the rules (µ) and (μ) on the premises and a (possibly dummy) contraction (i.e. a cut against an axiom) on the conclusion of the rule. Similarly for the axiom rule (for which there are two possible derivations) and the cut rule. For more details we refer the reader to [8] .
For a constant c, let Γ c (t), ∆ c (t), A c (t) be obtained from Γ, ∆, A by replacing each constant c with a term t.
Lemma 12 (Weakening
•
Moreover, no further cuts in the derivations on the right-hand side are necessary.
Lemma 13. Let c be a constant and y a variable which does not appear in Γ, ∆, A.
• Γ ⊢ ∆ implies Γ c (y) ⊢ ∆ c (y). 6 Note that we have to define the contexts of formulae Γ and ∆ as ordered sequences to get a non ambiguous interpretation of LK µμ as a typed λ-calculus. 7 The rules (µ) and (μ) are not introduction rules, because they do not introduce a formula constructor.
The following lemma says that a fresh constant is as good as a fresh variable and will play an important role in the proof of cut-free completeness below.
Lemma 14 (Fresh constants)
. Let c be a constant and y a variable which does not appear in Γ, ∆, A. Assume furthermore that c does not appear in Γ, ∆.
Proof. It follows directly from the lemma just before.
The fact that Lemma 12 ∼ Lemma 14 need not introduce any new cuts in the derivations on the right-hand side of the implication will be important for the proof of cut-free completeness.
We now show the soundness of LK µμ with respect to the Kripke semantics. First we need some preparations. We write w : Γ when w forces all sentences from Γ and w : ∆ when w refutes all sentences from ∆.
The intuitive meaning of the following theorem is that if every formula in the assumption is forced, then not all formulae in the conclusion can be refuted.
Theorem 15 (Soundness). Let A be a formula and Γ, ∆ contexts of formulae. In any classical Kripke model (K, ≤, D, s , ⊥ ) the following holds: Let w ∈ K and ρ be an associations with the values from D(w).
• • 
Completeness
As usual when constructively proving completeness of Kripke semantics for a fragment 8 of intuitionistic logic [6, 19, 30] , we define a special purpose model, called the universal model, built from the deduction system itself. Once we show completeness for this special model, completeness for any model follows (Corollary 19).
Definition 16. The Universal classical Kripke model U is obtained by setting:
• K to the set of pairs (Γ, ∆) of contexts of LK µμ ;
• (Γ, ∆) : X s iff the sequent Γ|X ⊢ ∆ is provable without a cut in LK µμ ;
• (Γ, ∆) : ⊥ iff the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is provable without a cut in LK µμ ;
• for any w, D(w) is the set of closed terms of LK µμ .
Note that the domain function D is a constant function, while in the abstract definition of model we allow for non-constant domain functions because that allows building more counter-models in applications.
Monotonicity of strong refutation on atoms follows from Lemma 12.
Theorem 17 (Cut-Free Completeness for U). For any sentence A and contexts of sentences Γ and ∆, the following hold in U:
Moreover, the derivations on the right-hand side of (1) and (2) are cut-free. 8 As previously remarked, there is no constructive proof for full intuitionistic predicate logic.
Proof. We proceed by simultaneously proving the two statements by induction on the complexity of A. When quantifiers are concerned, A(t) has lower complexity than ∃x.A(x) and ∀x.A(x). The derivation trees in this proof use meta-rules (*) and multi-step derivations (Contr L , Contr L ) in addition to the derivation rules of the calculus from Table 1 in order to make the proofs easier to read.
We also remind the reader that the notion of cut-freeness is the one of LK µμ , introduced in the previous section.
Base case for atomic formulae. In the base case we have forcing and refutation on atomic sentences, which by definition reduce to strong refutation on atomic sentences, which by definition reduces just to statements about the deductions in LK µμ .
(1) Suppose
where the RHS is cut-free. Then the following holds for Γ ′ = Γ and ∆ ′ = X, ∆:
We use ( * ) to prove Γ, X ⊢ ∆ without introducing a cut from which the claim follows by the (μ)-rule. For this, we need to show ((Γ, X),
Base cases for ⊤ and ⊥. Obvious.
Induction case for implication.
(1) Suppose (Γ, ∆) :
We use ( * ) to prove Γ, A 1 ⊢ A 2 , ∆ without introducing a cut from which the claim follows by the (µ) and (→ R ) rules. We need to show ((Γ, A 1 ), (A 2 , ∆)) :
We show the first one. The second case is similar.
Using the induction hypothesis we get the following cut-free proof:
We use ( * ) to prove Γ, A 1 → A 2 ⊢ ∆ without introducing a cut from which the claim follows by the (μ)-rule. We need to show ((Γ,
Then, using the induction hypotheses we have the following cut-free proof:
Induction case for ∨.
is exploding. Now we can prove the claim. Induction case for ∧.
(1) The claim follows directly from the (∧ R )-rule and the induction hypotheses because (Γ, ∆) : A 1 ∧ A 2 implies both (Γ, ∆) : A 1 and (Γ, ∆) : A 2 , by Lemma 5, which does not need to intruduce new cuts.
We use ( * ) to show Γ, A 1 ∧ A 2 ⊢ ∆ without introducing a cut from which the claim follows by the (μ)-rule. By Lemma 5, we need to show ((Γ,
Using induction hypotheses we get the following cut-free proof:
Induction case for ∀. 
We use ( * ) to show Γ, ∀x.A(x) ⊢ ∆ without introducing a cut from which the claim follows by the (μ)-rule, that is, we need to show ((Γ, ∀x.A(x)), ∆) :
Induction case for ∃.
(1) Suppose (Γ, ∆) : ∃x.A(x), i.e.,
We use ( * ) to show Γ ⊢ ∃x.A(x), ∆ without introducing a cut from which the claim follows using the (µ)-rule. We need to show (Γ, (∆, ∃x.A(x))) : A(t) for any closed term t.
Using the induction hypothesis we get the following cut-free proof: from the meta-language back to the object-language. The interpretation of the objectlanguage inside the meta-language, that goes via evaluation/soundness, is usually done using some form of Kripke models. So far, NBE has been used to show normalisation of various intuitionistic proof systems [5, 11, 2, 1, 28, 30] as well as purely computational calculi [12] . One advantage of taking this approach to that of studying a reduction relation for a proof calculus for classical logic, explicitly as a rewrite system, is that one circumvents both difficulties of rewrite systems and validating equalities arising from η-conversion. For more details on these difficulties the reader is referred to [33] , for classical proof systems, and [13] for intuitionistic proof systems. Another advantage is that these kinds of proofs manipulate finite structures only and avoid working with saturated models as, for example, in [31] .
Note also that, although as output from the NBE algorithm we get a β-reduced η-long normal form, we proved a weak NBE result, as we did not prove that the output can be obtained from the input by a number of rewrite steps, as it is done in [6] .
Dual Notion of Model
Thanks to the symmetry of the LK µμ rules for left-distinguished and right-distinguished formulae, it is possible to define a dual notion of model in which:
• "strong forcing" is taken as primitive and "refutation" and non-strong "forcing" are defined from it by orthogonality like in Definition 2,
• for the universal model, strong forcing is defined as cut-free provability of rightdistinguished formulae (instead of left-distinguished ones for strong refutation), and prove, completely analogously to the proofs presented in this paper, that we have the same soundness and completeness theorems holding. The reader interested in the computational behaviour of the completeness theorem, should look at its partial Coq formalisation [20] . From that work it follows that the NBE theorem computes the normal forms of proofs in call-by-name discipline. We mention this work because we would like to conjecture that the presented classical Kripke model always gives rise to call-by-name behaviour for proof normalisation, while the dual notion gives rise to call-by-value behaviour. As one of the referees remarked, there is a variety of different strategies for doing proof normalisation, of which call-by-name and call-by-value are the simplest ones to describe, but also the most standard ones. For a general study of cut-elimination strategies that are more complex than call-by-name and call-by-value, the reader is referred to [10] .
Using Intuitionistic Kripke Models on Doubly-Negated Formulae
Although one can define a double-negation interpretation A * of formulae and use intuitionistic Kripke models and an intuitionistic completeness theorem to obtain a normalisation result, one would have to pass through the chain of inferences
where "i" stands for "intuitionistic", "c" for "classical" and "nf" for "in normal form", in which how to do the last inference is not obvious. We consider that to be a detour since we can prove, simply, the chain of inferences
The interest in having a direct-style semantics for classical logic is the same as the interest in having a proof calculus for classical logic instead of restricting oneself to an intuitionistic calculus and working with doubly-negated formulae; or, in the theory of programming languages, to having a separate constant call-cc instead of writing all programs in continuation-passing style.
Avigad shows in [3] how classical cut-elimination is a special case of intuitionistic one, work which resembles the first chain of inferences of this subsection. However, his work is specialised to "negative" formulae, that is, it is not clear how to extend it to formulae that use ∨ and ∃.
Finally, we remark that an interpretation through intuitionistic Kripke models and a double-negation interpretation would have to be done in Kripke models with exploding nodes, because of the meta-mathematical results from [21, 26, 27] .
Boolean vs. Kripke Semantics for Classical Logic
We compare Boolean and Kripke semantics in a constructive setting, based on our own observations (which we hope to submit for publication soon) and based on a strand of works in mathematical logic from the 1960s.
Computational Behaviour. The only known constructive completeness proof of classical logic with respect to Boolean models is the one of Krivine [24] , who used a doublenegation interpretation to translate Gödel's original proof. Krivine's proof was later reworked by Berardi and Valentini [4] to show that its main ingredient is a constructive version of the ultra-filter theorem for countable Boolean algebras. This theorem, however, crucially relies on an enumeration of the members of the algebra (the formulae).
In the work we mentioned as yet to be put into words, a formalisation in constructive type theory of the proof of Berardi and Valentini, we saw that, as a consequence of relying on the linear order, the reduction relation for proof-terms corresponding to implicative formulae is not β-reduction, but an ad hoc reduction relation which depends on the particular way one defines the linear order (enumeration of formulae). As a consequence, there is no clear notion of normal form suggested by the ad hoc reduction relation. The cut-free completeness theorem given in this paper, however, gives rise to a normalisation algorithm which respects the β-reduction relation of the objectlanguage, when the Kripke models are interpreted in a type theory which is based on β-reduction itself.
Expressiveness. We think of classical Kripke model validity as being more expressive, i.e. containing more information, than Boolean model validity. That is indicated by the presented completeness theorem which is both simpler than (constructive) completeness theorems for Boolean models, and manipulates finite structures directly, instead of relying on structures built up by an infinite saturation process. Also, only after submitting the first version of the present text, we became aware of the work done in the 1960s on using Kripke models to do model theory of classical logic [14] . Although conducted in a classical meta-language, the work indicates that it is possible to use Kripke models to express elegantly some cumbersome constructions of model theory, like set theoretic forcing [9, 14] . Indeed, the connection between the two had been spotted already by Kripke [23] and hence the term "forcing" appeared in Kripke semantics. We hope that looking at those kind of constructions inside Kripke models, but this time inside a constructive meta-language, might be an interesting venue to finding out the constructive content of techniques of classical model theory.
In this respect, our work can also be seen as a contribution to the field of constructive model theory of classical logic.
